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I. INTRODUCTION
As the criminal justice system increasingly relies upon expert evidence,
including scientific or pseudo-scientific evidence, the contingent and
evolutionary nature of scientific knowledge poses growing challenges to the
fair administration of justice. Professor Edward Imwinkelried’s thoughtful
contribution to this symposium in part grapples with those challenges.1 We
fear, however, that, in addressing some of those problems, Professor
Imwinkelried has painted too broadly, and has failed to acknowledge or
address nuances that are very real and indeed common in so-called “shifted
science” cases,2 and that require a different calculus than he applies.
*

Associate Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin Law School.
John J. Gibbons Professor of Law, Seton Hall University School of Law.
1
Edward J. Imwinkelried, Debunked, Discredited, but Still Defended Revising State
Post-Conviction Relief Statutes to Cover Convictions Resting on Subsequently Invalidated
Expert Testimony, 48 SETON HALL L. REV. 1095 (2018).
2
“Shifted science” refers to situations in which new scientific studies undermine the
consensus that once existed in regard to particular knowledge claims, which claims are
sometimes (but not always) based on science-derived evidence to begin with. See Caitlin M.
Plummer & Imran J. Syed, “Shifted Science” and Post-Conviction Relief, 8 STAN. J. CIV. RTS.
& CIV. LIB. 259 (2012); Caitlin M. Plummer & Imran J. Syed, “Shifted Science” Revisited:
Percolation Delays and the Persistence of Wrongful Convictions Based on Outdated Science,
64 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 483 (2016); Caitlin M. Plummer & Imran J. Syed, Criminal Procedure
†
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In order to set up our criticisms in context, we must summarize
Professor Imwinkelried’s position more broadly. As he explains in detail at
the outset, the article concentrates on a single variable in a multi-variable
analysis that is required under the law to determine if new scientific
knowledge warrants giving post-conviction relief to a person whose original
trial included the now-challenged expert results. That single issue is whether
the results of new research sufficiently undermine the testimony given at trial
to justify relief if the other variables in the applicable legal test are satisfied.
He begins this part of the analysis by two extreme examples to anchor the
two ends of a continuum. The first assumes that new research exists, but that
it actually supports or does not contradict the main thrust of the testimony at
issue, and this obviously would not qualify as undermining the trial
testimony even though there were relevant post-trial research results.3 The
second hypothesizes post-trial research that “thoroughly discredits the
validity of the earlier testimony.”4 This circumstance would justify giving
post-conviction relief, again assuming the other parts of the applicable test
were met. Finally, in discussing situations where the research arguably
creates a basis to doubt the trial testimony falling short of his notion of
“thoroughly discrediting” the trial testimony, Professor Imwinkelried begins
his analysis as follows: “Suppose that after a criminal trial at which the
prosecution relied on expert testimony, later scientific research raises a
question about the validity of the testimony. Standing alone, that should not
lead to a new trial.”5
In its most elemental sense, Professor Imwinkelried’s point might often
be correct, at least when limited in the sense that he himself limits it. He
expands on his point in this way: “Assume that after a criminal trial at which
the prosecution relied on expert testimony, later scientific research raises a
question about the validity of the testimony. Standing alone, that should not
lead to a new trial.”6 He later contrasts such situations from situations where
vs. Scientific Progress: The Challenging Path to Post-Conviction Relief in Cases That Arise
During Periods of Shifts in Science, 41 VT. L. REV. 279 (2016).
3
Imwinkelried, supra note 1, at 1107. He illustrates this with a DNA example—that
the development of the STR technique for analyzing DNA did not call into question the
accuracy of the results of previously testified to single locus probe RFLP DNA results.
4
Imwinkelried, supra note 1, at 1108. He illustrates this with another DNA example—
that results from the single locus probe RFLP process that contradicted previously testified to
results of the earlier multi-locus probe technique were simply more accurate than the previous
results. NOTE—it is not the results of the single locus probe that directly contradict the
previous testimony exactly, but the realization that the multi-locus probe technique potentially
had much greater potential dependency between alleles and made the product rule of
questionable application. The single locus probe results merely confirmed that overvaluation
in the individual case when it generated a random match probability greater than that testified
to in the previous case that used the product rule on multi-locus probe results.
5
Imwinkelried, supra note 1, text at 1109 n.60.
6
Imwinkelried, supra note 1, at 1109.
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the later research “seriously undermines” the trial testimony. So, his main
division of intermediate cases where new research does not “thoroughly
discredit” the trial testimony is between those where new research merely
“raises a question” about the trial testimony, and those which “seriously
undermine” the trial testimony.7
Putting aside any reservations about whether this binary classification
can appropriately handle the myriad types of expertise involved in trial
testimony and the myriad ways that new research can bear on it, our main
objection is to the use of the controversy over Shaken Baby Syndrome as an
example of subsequent research which “merely raises a question” about the
propriety of trial testimony.
Professor Imwinkelried elaborates:
Suppose that after the trial, a single new scientific study reaches
an outcome at odds with the validity of the expert technique relied
on at trial. The subsequent research may render the prior testimony
debatable but, at this point, the testimony has hardly been
debunked. The outcome in the new research could easily be an
artifact.8
However, we believe that Professor Imwinkelried goes astray when he
uses the current debates raging about the Shaken Baby Syndrome (SBS)
(now more frequently and expansively called “Abusive Head Trauma”
(AHT)), to illustrate this point.
We believe that Professor Imwinkelried overlooks the true nature of the
medical-scientific debates in SBS/AHT cases; the import of the expert
evidence in such cases; the various legal issues that can arise related to the
expert testimony in such cases; and ultimately, therefore, the significance of
newly recognized controversies in the medico-legal hypotheses underlying
expert testimony in such cases. We examine each of these concerns in turn.
II. THE MEDICAL AND SCIENTIFIC DEBATES ABOUT SBS/AHT
Given the case that Professor Imwinkelried initially posits—one in
which ample scientific research supports the expert testimony of prosecution
witnesses at trial, and, after conviction, the defense comes up with “a single
new scientific study” that contradicts it (or even several such studies)—such
a case ordinarily would not lead one to conclude safely that the state’s
hypothesis has been debunked, or perhaps even undermined sufficiently to
warrant a new trial. But that does not describe the nature of either the
7
8

Imwinkelried, supra note 1, at 1106, 1109.
Imwinkelried, supra note 1, at 1109.
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underlying science or the new research in the SBS/AHT debates (or, for that
matter, the standards for obtaining a new trial).
To begin, the convictions in such cases, when they rest on the SBS/
AHT hypothesis, rest upon a thin reed indeed and not a well-researched and
validated scientific principle. The SBS hypothesis was first developed in the
1970s as a way to try to understand what was happening when babies
presented with serious brain injuries but no external signs of trauma.9 But
because it is ethically impossible to conduct randomized controlled studies
involving shaking and other abuse of children, it has been exceedingly
difficult to conduct high-quality scientific studies to validate or invalidate
the hypothesis. As a consequence, the hypothesis remains largely
unvalidated, devoid of a solid evidence base to establish either that shaking
alone can cause such injuries, or that shaking alone or combined with an
impact can be “diagnosed” reliably on the basis of the medical findings often
used to form the expert opinions in these cases.10 Indeed, as Dr. Norman
Guthkelch, one of the “fathers” of the SBS hypothesis, wrote, some 40+
years after he first proposed the hypothesis, he initially floated the idea as a
hypothesis, and only a hypothesis, and it remains just that—an unproven
hypothesis still in search of scientific support.11 The fundamental premise
underlying Professor Imwinkelried’s hypothetical therefore does not
describe the real world of SBS/AHT cases.
Many proponents of the hypothesis adamantly insist, especially when
responding to defense challenges to the expert testimony, that the hypothesis
is well supported by volumes of research.12 And indeed there are volumes
of papers devoted to trying to understand such brain injuries in infants and
young children, and in particular attempting to support both the SBS
hypothesis and the diagnostic criteria for SBS/AHT. But none of that
research achieves high quality-of-evidence ratings under evidence-based
9

See Arthur N. Guthkelch, Infantile Subdural Haematoma and its Relationship to
Whiplash Injuries, 2 BRIT. MED. J. 430 (1971); John Caffee, The Whiplash Shaken Infant
Syndrome: Manual Shaking by the Extremities with Whiplash-Induced Intraocular Bleedings,
Linked with Residual Permanent Brain Damage and Mental Retardation, 54 PEDIATRICS 396
(1974).
10
See Keith A. Findley, Patrick D. Barnes, David A. Moran & Waney Squier, Shaken
Baby Syndrome, Abusive Head Trauma, and Actual Innocence: Getting It Right, 12 HOUS. J.
HEALTH L. & POL’Y 209, 263–67 (2012).
11
Arthur N. Guthkelch, Problems of Infant-Retino-Dural Hemorrhage with Minimal
External Injury, 12 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 201, 207 (2012) (“SBS and AHT are
hypotheses that have been advanced to explain findings that are not yet fully understood.
There is nothing wrong in advancing such hypotheses; this is how medicine and science
progress. It is wrong, however, to fail to advise parents and courts when these are simply
hypotheses, not proven medical or scientific facts, or to attack those who point out problems
with these hypotheses or who advance alternatives.”).
12
See, e.g., Sandeep K. Narang, A Daubert Analysis of Abusive Head Trauma / Shaken
Baby Syndrome, 11 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 505 (2011), and literature cited therein.
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medicine standards, for the reasons outlined above. Most of the research is
of necessity retrospective in nature; it involves examining cases in which
children have suffered severe brain injury or death, dividing them into
“abuse” or “non-abuse” categories, and then looking to see what conclusions
can be drawn from, and what diagnostic features are presented in, each
category. But because there is no gold standard for distinguishing abuse
from non-abuse, the research tends to rely for sorting on the very diagnostic
features being studied (typically subdural hematoma, retinal hemorrhages,
cerebral edema, or a smattering of other findings)—thereby building in a
circularity confound. Virtually all of the research in the field—including
that purporting to support the SBS/AHT hypothesis—recognizes this
inherent circularity challenge.13
Where attempts have been made to evaluate the evidence base under
evidence-based-medicine standards, the evidence base has invariably come
up wanting.14 Most recently, the Swedish Agency for Health Technology
Assessment and Assessment of Social Services (SBU) undertook an
exhaustive review of the literature in the field and concluded that “[t]here is
limited scientific evidence” to support the claim that the traditional
diagnostic “triad” or “its components can be associated with traumatic
shaking (very low quality evidence)” and that “[t]here is insufficient
scientific evidence on which to assess the diagnostic accuracy of the triad in
identifying traumatic shaking (very low quality evidence).”15 The SBU
13

See, e.g., S. A. Maguire et al., Estimating the Probability of Abusive Head Trauma: A
Pooled Analysis, 128 PEDIATRICS 550, 558 (2011) (“Diagnostic studies in this field are open
to criticism of circularity because of their dependence on a constellation of clinical features,
as opposed to a single gold-standard diagnostic test, which does not exist.”); Shalea J. Piteau
et al., Clinical and Radiographic Characteristics Associated with Abusive and Nonabusive
Head Trauma: A Systematic Review, 130 PEDIATRICS 315, 321 (2012) (“As there are no
standardized criteria for the definition of abuse, most authors developed their own criteria and
many of these are fraught with circular reasoning.”); Narang, supra note 12, at 560–62 (while
defending the research on SBS / AHT, acknowledging that “some circularity is inevitable,
because we are unwilling to experimentally shake infants, and even reliably confessed
accounts have some doubts”).
14
See, e.g., Mark Donohoe, Evidence-Based Medicine and Shaken Baby Syndrome, 24
AM. J. FORENSIC MED. & PATHOLOGY 239, 239 (2003). Dr. Donohoe’s paper has been
criticized by SBS-hypothesis proponents, who claim that the search terms he used for his
literature review were not expansive enough. See, e.g., Joelle Anne Moreno & Brian
Holmgren, The Supreme Court Screws Up the Science: There is No Abusive Head
Trauma/Shaken Baby Syndrome Scientific Controversy, 2013 UTAH L. REV. 1357, 1390–96
(2013); Narang, supra note 12, at 535. But those critics have never identified any papers that
Dr. Donohoe’s search omitted that would have changed his assessment—that the evidence
base is very weak—in any way. Nor have they identified any errors in his application of
evidence-based-medicine standards to the research, other than to assert that, because
SBS / AHT research can never employ randomized controlled studies, that inherent weakness
should not be held against the research base. Narang, supra note 12, at 535.
15
Niels Lynøe, Göran Elinder, Boubou Hallberg, Måns Rosén, Pia Maly Sundgren &
Anders Eriksson, Insufficient Evidence for “Shaken Baby Syndrome”—A Systematic Review,

FINDLEYRISINGER (DO NOT DELETE)

1214

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

8/8/2018 2:35 PM

[Vol. 48:1209

elaborated:
Although relatively many studies met the criteria for inclusion [in
this literature review], the literature search identified only two
studies of moderate quality. This is disconcerting, because
traumatic shaking is very serious and has dramatic consequences
for both the child and its family. The research field is complex,
but this does not excuse, for example, circular reasoning and
inadequate presentation of data collection. It is important that
reviews of the field include consideration of the methodological
flaws which characterise this field of research.16
In this country, while no comparable governmental inquiry has yet been
conducted into the scientific status of the SBS hypothesis, the President’s
Council of Advisors on Science and Technology (PCAST), in its 2016
groundbreaking report on other forensic sciences, observed “that there are
issues related to the scientific validity of other types of forensic evidence that
are beyond the scope of this report but require urgent attention—including
notably . . . abusive head trauma commonly referred to as ‘Shaken Baby
Syndrome.’”17
Indeed, even many of the SBS-hypothesis’s strongest advocates, in
their more candid moments, have acknowledged that the mechanism of
injury in these cases is poorly understood, and that the scientific foundation
is not solid.18 In 2009, for example, the American Academy of Pediatrics—
which as an organization consistently and vehemently defends the SBS/
AHT hypothesis—revised its official position paper, backing off of some of
the certainty about the “diagnosis” that it had expressed in earlier iterations,19
observing that “[f]ew pediatric diagnoses engender as much debate as AHT,”
and that “many clinicians and researchers acknowledge that precise
106 ACTA PAEDIATRICA 1021 (2017).
16
Id. at 1027.
17
PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT:
FORENSIC SCIENCE IN CRIMINAL COURTS: ENSURING SCIENTIFIC VALIDITY OF FEATURECOMPARISON METHODS 23 n.15 (2016) (emphasis added).
18
See, e.g., Mark Dias, The Case for Shaking, in CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT: DIAGNOSIS,
TREATMENT, AND EVIDENCE 364 (2011) (‘‘Unfortunately, nobody has yet marshalled a
coherent and comprehensive argument in support of shaking as a causal mechanism for
abusive head injury.’’); M. Vaughn Emerson et al., Ocular Autopsy and Histopathologic
Features of Child Abuse, 114 AM. ACAD. OPHTHALMOLOGY 1384, 1394 (2007); Cindy W.
Christian et al., Abusive Head Trauma in Infants and Children, 123 PEDIATRICS 1409, 1410
(2009), http://pediatrics.aappublications.org/content/pediatrics/123/5/1409.full.pdf. Critics of
the SBS hypothesis also make the point. See, e.g., Waney Squier, The “Shaken Baby”
Syndrome: Pathology and Mechanisms, 122 ACTA NEUROPATHOLOGICA 519, 521 (2011).
19
For a discussion of the changes in the position papers, see Findley et al., supra note
10, at 240–42.
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mechanisms for all abusive injuries remain incompletely understood.”20 In
a leading child abuse textbook, Dr. Mark Dias, another prominent proponent
of the hypothesis, similarly acknowledged the thinness of the science in a
chapter meant to provide the definitive argument in support of the
hypothesis. In that chapter, entitled, “The Case for Shaking,” after
acknowledging the lack of scientific evidence for the hypothesis, Dr. Dias
concluded that “confessed shaking . . . is the evidentiary basis for shaking.”21
Given all this, and after hearing extensive testimony from experts on
both sides of the debates in federal habeas corpus proceedings, federal
District Court Judge Matthew Kennelly found Jennifer Del Prete to be
innocent of the SBS crime for which she had been convicted.22 In so ruling,
Judge Kennelly found, in part, that the extensive scientific evidence
presented to him “arguably suggests that a claim of shaken baby syndrome
is more an article of faith than a proposition of science.”23
We fear that Professor Imwinkelried has glossed over the serious nature
of the challenge to SBS/AHT expert opinions by framing the dispute as
essentially one between pediatricians, armed with a solid body of medical
research supporting the SBS/AHT hypothesis on the one hand, and a small
group of biomechanical engineers armed with a few contradictory studies on
the other.24 Professor Imwinkelried notes, for example, that, “in recent years,
20

Christian et al., supra note 18, at 1409–10.
Dias, supra note 18, at 364 (emphasis in original). To anyone familiar with either the
literature on wrongful convictions or the social science literature on confessions and
interrogations, such unquestioning reliance on alleged confessions to substitute for scientific
research is, to say the least, startling. See Findley et al., supra note 10; DEBORAH
TUERKHEIMER, FLAWED CONVICTIONS: “SHAKEN BABY SYNDROME” AND THE INERTIA OF
INJUSTICE (2014).
22
Del Prete v. Thompson, 10 F. Supp. 3d 907, 958 (N.D. Ill. 2014) (concluding that “no
reasonable juror, hearing all of the evidence including that from Del Prete’s experts, could
find her guilty beyond a reasonable doubt”).
23
Id. at 957 n.10.
24
In part, this may be because Professor Imwinkelried was misled by some of the
writings he cites by authors such as Professor Joelle Anne Moreno and former SBS-prosecutor
Brian Holmgren. See, e.g., Moreno & Holmgren, supra note 14. In those writings, Moreno
and Holmgren take the U.S. Supreme Court (and the SBS-critics the justices relied upon) to
task for recognizing the controversies in the SBS / AHT “diagnosis” in Cavazos v. Smith, 132
S. Ct. 2, 10 (2011) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). In their critique, Moreno and Holmgren
misleadingly take up one of the SBS proponents’ new strategic ploys—to deny that there is
any controversy about SBS / AHT, or any weakness in the scientific foundations for the
hypothesis—despite the widespread recognition of both the controversies and the weaknesses
of the scientific foundation, discussed above, and elsewhere. See supra notes 9–21 and
accompanying text; see also Carol E. Nicholson, Preface to AMERICAN ACADEMY OF
PEDIATRICS, INFLICTED CHILDHOOD NEUROTRAUMA, at IX (Robert M. Reece & Carol E.
Nicholson eds., 2003) (“The debate of ‘shaken baby syndrome’ continues to rage in our
country. Because there is very little scientific experimental or descriptive work, the
pathophysiology remains obscure, and the relationship to mechanics even cloudier. The
situation has not been made better by the constant emotional and forensic advocacy, which
21
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biomechanical experts have sharply criticized the hypothesis. They rely
primarily on studies with primates and anthropomorphic models. Those
studies suggest that without more, mere shaking cannot generate enough
force to cause fatal injury to the infant brain.”25
Indeed the biomechanical research does pose an enormous challenge to
the SBS hypothesis, because the biomechanical research—using wellaccepted research tools and methodologies—consistently shows that violent
shaking of an infant by a human adult cannot generate accelerations that
come anywhere close to estimated thresholds for brain injury or death.26 The
research also consistently shows that, if shaking could generate sufficient
accelerations, it would necessarily produce massive neck and spine
injuries—which are not typical in SBS/AHT cases.27 Finally, the
biomechanical research consistently shows that short-distance falls (such as
seems to escalate every week on every side of this subject area. . . . What we need is science—
research and evidence that just isn’t there right now. The evidence that does exist has not
been subjected to evidence-based scrutiny in a multidisciplinary scientific forum.”); Stephen
Goudge, INQUIRY INTO PEDIATRIC FORENSIC PATHOLOGY IN ONTARIO—REPORT 527–28
(2008) (“[O]ne of the deepest controversies surrounding pediatric forensic pathology
concerns shaken baby syndrome. . . . [The] evolution in forensic pathology in this area [has
progressed such that] the predominant view is no longer that the triad on its own is diagnostic
of SBS. Instead, the issue is fraught with controversy.”); Sandeep K. Narang et al.,
Acceptance of Shaken Baby Syndrome and Abusive Head Trauma as Medical Diagnoses, 177
J. PEDIATRICS 273, 277 (2016) (reporting that two surveys of pathologists found that thirtyfive percent to nearly sixty percent of forensic pathologists in 2010 and 2015 respectively
question the SBS “diagnosis”). In a new book, Randy Papetti meticulously and thoroughly
debunks the specious claim that there is no legitimate debate about SBS / AHT. RANDY
PAPETTI, THE FORENSIC UNRELIABILITY OF THE SHAKEN BABY SYNDROME ch. 4 (2017).
25
Imwinkelried, supra note 1, at 1111 (footnote omitted).
26
See, e.g., Christine Duhaime et al., The Shaken Baby Syndrome: A Clinical,
Pathological and Biomechanical Study, 66 J. NEUROSURGERY 409, 414 (1987); Michael
Thomas Prange et al., Anthropomorphic Simulation of Falls, Shakes and Inflicted Impacts in
Infants, 99 J. NEUROSURGERY 143, 147, 149 (2003); John Lloyd et al., Biomechanical
Evaluation of Head Kinematics During Infant Shaking Versus Pediatric Activities of Daily
Living, J. FORENSIC BIOMECHANICS 6 (2011). As Professor Imwinkelried notes, SBShypothesis-proponents challenge the biomechanical research; indeed, they contend that the
biomechanical research must all be wrong, in part because it relies on estimates of injury
thresholds for infants that could be wrong. Estimating injury thresholds for infants is indeed
a challenge, but that critique would only invalidate the findings of the biomechanical research
if those estimates—based on extrapolation from known injury thresholds for adults, cadaver
studies, animal studies, and computer modeling—were off by many orders of magnitude,
which is highly unlikely. Moreover, that critique implicitly puts the burden of proof on the
critics of the SBS hypothesis to prove that infant injury thresholds are not being estimated at
least approximately correctly based on existing evidence, rather than on SBS-hypothesisproponents to prove that the injury threshold is some order of magnitude different, a
proposition for which there is no biomechanical evidence.
27
See, e.g., Faris A. Bandak, Shaken Baby Syndrome: A Biomechanics Analysis of Injury
Mechanisms, 151 FORENSIC SCI. INT’L 71, 71 (2005), https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/ee5c
/5d9a5279da7237272ee50a76fa0344a9902e.pdf?_ga=2.255732685.434200710.1526570687
-1838845519.1526570687; Prange et al., supra note 25, at 147; PAPETTI, supra note 24, at
96–104, and sources cited therein.
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falls off of furniture) produce many times more accelerations than the most
vigorous shaking, and that they can produce accelerations that exceed
estimated injury thresholds28—thereby debunking one of the cardinal
principles of the SBS dogma, which has consistently maintained that the
medical findings and injuries used to diagnose SBS/AHT cannot be caused
by accidental short-distance falls.29
Moreover, unlike the (perhaps unintended) suggestion of Professor
Imwinkelried’s analysis, the challenge to the SBS/AHT hypothesis does not
rest solely on biomechanical engineering studies. Much of the challenge
comes from a large and growing body of medical literature questioning the
hypothesized mechanism and pathophysiology of injury in such cases.30
Much also rests on a large and growing body of medical research identifying
a range of natural and accidental causes that can and do generate the findings
and injuries previously ascribed virtually exclusively to SBS/AHT—the socalled “mimics” of abuse, which can confound any attempt to “diagnose”
abuse.31 And much of it rests on a large and growing body of medical and
28
Patrick E. Lantz & Daniel E. Couture, Fatal Acute Intracranial Injury, Subdural
Hematoma and Retinal Hemorrhages Caused by Stairway Falls, 56 J. FORENSIC SCI. 1648
(2011); Nicole G. Ibrahim & Susan S. Margulies, Biomechanics of Toddler Head During
Low-Height Falls: An Anthropomorphic Dummy Analysis, 6 J. NEUROSURGERY PEDIATRICS
57 (2010); Chittaranjan Behera, Ravi Rautji & Tirath Das Dogra, Fatal Accidental Fall from
Height in Infants and Children: A Study from South Delhi, 50 MED., SCI., & L. 224 (2010);
Michael Thomas Prange, Ann-Christine Duhaime, Brittany Coats & Susan S. Margulies,
Anthropomorphic Simulation of Falls, Shakes and Inflicted Impacts in Infants, 99 J.
NEUROSURGERY 143 (2003); Paul Steinbok, Ashutosh Singhal, Ken Poskitt & D. Douglas
Cochrane, Early Hypodensity on Computed Tomographic Scan of the Brain in an Accidental
Pediatric Head Injury, 60 NEUROSURGERY 689 (2007); John Plunkett, Fatal Pediatric Head
Injuries Caused by Short Distance Falls, 22 AM. J. FORENSIC MED. & PATHOLOGY 1 (2001),
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/c67e/29d482e7f9bea8f50ff3be3698b770dd4faa.pdf.
29
See Findley et al., supra note 10, at 245–49.
30
See, e.g., Patrick D. Barnes, Imaging of Nonaccidental Injury And The Mimics: Issues
and Controversies in the Era of Evidence-Based Medicine, 49 RADIOLOGIC CLINICS N. AM.
205 (2011); J.F. Geddes et al., Dural Haemorrhage in Non-Traumatic Infant Deaths: Does It
Explain the Bleeding in ‘Shaken Baby Syndrome’?, 29 NEUROPATHOLOGY & APPLIED
NEUROBIOLOGY 14, 14 (2003); J.F. Geddes et al., Neuropathology of Inflicted Head Injury in
Children, I. Patterns of Brain Damage, 124 BRAIN 1290 (2001); J.F. Geddes et al.,
Neuropathology of Inflicted Head Injury in Children, II. Microscopic Brain Injury in Infants,
124 BRAIN 1299, 1299, 1304 (2001); Waney Squier, The “Shaken Baby” Syndrome:
Pathology and Mechanisms, 122 ACTA NEUROPATHOLOGICA 519 (2011); Julie Mack, Waney
Squier & James Eastman, Anatomy and Development of the Meninges: Implications for
Subdural Collections and CSF Circulation, 39 PEDIATRIC RADIOLOGY 200, 200 (2009);
Ronald H. Uscinski, Shaken Baby Syndrome: An Odyssey, 46 NEUROLOGIA MEDICOCHIRURGICA (Tokyo) 57 (2006).
31
See, e.g., Patrick D. Barnes & Michael Krasnokutsky, Imaging of the Central Nervous
System in Suspected or Alleged Nonaccidental Injury, Including the Mimics, 18 TOPICS
MAGNETIC RESONANCE IMAGING 53, 65–70 (2007); Andrew P. Sirotnak, Medical Disorders
that Mimic Abusive Head Trauma, in ABUSIVE HEAD TRAUMA IN INFANTS AND CHILDREN: A
MEDICAL, LEGAL, AND FORENSIC REFERENCE 191 (Lori Frasier et al., eds., 2006).
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other scientific research indisputably debunking previously held beliefs
about various aspects of the SBS/AHT hypothesis, such as old beliefs that
the shaking had to have been intentional or at least reckless, because it would
have required force equivalent to throwing a child out of a third-floor
window or hitting a child with an automobile at 30 miles per hour;32 or old
beliefs that a child with the telltale brain injuries would have been rendered
immediately comatose and unresponsive and could not have experienced a
“lucid interval” between injury and collapse;33 or old beliefs that findings
like retinal hemorrhages could be caused by nothing except the violent
rotational forces associated with shaking.34 Finally, as discussed above, the
challenge rests on the growing recognition that the SBS/AHT hypothesis
simply lacks a scientific evidence base.
III. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE EXPERT EVIDENCE IN SBS/AHT CASES
Professor Imwinkelried’s analysis also, we fear, fails to appreciate
sufficiently the significance of the scientific or medical opinion evidence in
SBS/AHT cases, and thereby fails to recognize the corresponding
importance of new medical and scientific evidence when it emerges to
challenge the trial expert testimony. More than almost any other type of case
(with the possible exception of arson35), SBS/AHT prosecutions often rely
almost entirely on expert testimony. The typical case is an unwitnessed
event in which a child is found in seizure, or comatose and unresponsive.
(Indeed, remarkably, no documented cases in the literature of which we are
aware involve videotaped or even reliably witnessed incidents of shaking
leading to serious brain injury or death; in every such videotaped incident
involving violent shaking of which we are aware the child has been
uninjured.)36 Expert testimony is then used to establish every element of the
crime.

32

See Keith A. Findley, Examining Shaken Baby Syndrome Convictions in Light of New
Medical Scientific Research, 37 OKLA. CITY L. REV. 219, 223 (2012); Deborah Tuerkheimer,
The Next Innocence Project: Shaken Baby Syndrome and the Criminal Courts, 87 WASH. U.
L. REV. 1, 4 (2009).
33
See, e.g., M.G.F. Gilliland, Interval Duration Between Injury and Severe Symptoms in
Nonaccidental Head Trauma in Infants and Young Children, 43 J. FORENSIC SCI. 723, 724
(1998).
34
See, e.g., E. Matshes, Retinal and Optic Nerve Sheath Hemorrhages Are Not
Pathognomonic of Abusive Head Injury, 16 PROC. OF THE AM. ACAD. FORENS. SCI. 272
(2010); Findley et al., supra note 10, at 251–54.
35
See, e.g., Keith A. Findley, Flawed Science and the New Wave of Innocents, in
WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS AND THE DNA REVOLUTION: TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF FREEING THE
INNOCENT 184 (Daniel S. Medwed ed., 2017).
36
By contrast, there are now numerous reliably witnessed and videotaped incidents in
which children have suffered short-distance falls (such as off of chairs or beds or low-height
indoor play structures that resulted in brain injury and death).
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The experts opine as to the actus reus—violent shaking, or shaking with
impact, had to have been employed to produce such injuries. The experts
likewise opine as to mens rea—the shaking had to have been so violent that
it could not have been accidental; it had to have been intentional, or at least
reckless (the typical elements required for child abuse or homicide). And
finally, the experts often opine—erroneously—that because the child would
have become immediately comatose and unresponsive, the last person with
the child had to be the perpetrator, thereby establishing identity.37 These
cases are thus what Professor Deborah Tuerkheimer has aptly called a
“medical diagnosis of murder.”38
In this sense, though, even that terminology is not quite right, for these
cases do not involve a medical diagnosis in the true sense. Rather, they
involve a causation inquiry that goes beyond diagnosis, and ventures into
etiology—a matter that exceeds the expertise of physicians, and makes the
medical opinion evidence simultaneously much more important and less
reliable than expert evidence in other kinds of cases.
As used in medicine, diagnosis refers to the process of determining the
disease or dysfunctional condition from which a patient suffers in order to
determine the best course of treatment to cure or relieve the disease or
condition. The disease or condition is inferred from signs, symptoms, risk
factors, and the results of diagnostic tests. Signs are objective conditions or
manifestations observed by the physician either directly or with the aid of
sense-enhancing instruments such as a stethoscope. Symptoms are
subjective reports of pain, weakness, or other conditions associated with the
complaint of the patient in regard to a dysfunctional condition or disease.
Risk factors (beyond those represented directly by signs or symptoms) are
such things as family history of disease, exposure to disease-causing agents,
etc., which are usually derived from the patient’s history as recounted by the
patient (or next of kin), or derived from the patient’s previous medical
records. Finally, diagnostic tests, which are often the result of chemical
analysis of bodily fluids or tissues, give results correlated by previous
research with certain diseases or conditions. They are usually performed by
someone other than the treating physician and are often now instrumented to
a greater or lesser degree.
One thing to note at the outset is that diagnosis is not directly concerned
with the cause of a disease or condition, although some diagnoses will entail
causes established by previous research, and some diagnostic tests will
reveal the presence of a causal agent associated with the condition by
37

DEBORAH TUERKHEIMER, FLAWED
THE INERTIA OF INJUSTICE 5 (2014).
38

CONVICTIONS: “SHAKEN BABY SYNDROME”

AND

Deborah Tuerkheimer, The Next Innocence Project: Shaken Baby Syndrome and the
Criminal Courts, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 1, 5 (2009).
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previous research. The point is that diagnostic judgment itself does not
address causation independent of previous research on the cause of a disease
or constellation of sign and symptoms.
This is true also of the iterative process known as differential diagnosis.
Differential diagnosis refers to the process whereby the physician ideally
determines all the diseases or conditions that might account for a set of signs
and symptoms, rank orders them by probability (or sometimes severity), and
proceeds to attempt to rule out the members of the list by further tests. In
practice, whether one actually rules out of every possibility except one will
depend on the remoteness of initial probabilities and the availability and
expense of diagnostic tests, and often the most life-threatening or the most
probable disease after convenient diagnostic testing has been done will be
treated first, and only when treatment fails will that disease be eliminated
and either further more rigorous or costly testing, or treatment for the next
most likely disease, be undertaken. Note that differential diagnosis involves
a feedback loop where initial diagnostic hypotheses are modified in light of
newly acquired information. And most importantly, skill in differential
diagnosis (or diagnosis generally) does not provide one with special skill in
determining causation in regard to the disease or condition finally settled on
and treated successfully. The skill is in determining the disease or condition
in the patient, and knowing how to treat it successfully, not in determining
its cause.39 Determining cause (the “etiology” of a disease) is a specialty of
scientific medical research, not of practical diagnosis by practicing
physicians. Of course, practicing physicians may be willing to opine on
causation of conditions like various cancers, and they may invoke their
diagnostic skills in the process, but this is misplaced. Determining the
etiology of a disease that has not yet been established by formal research
(even through a process that might resemble “differential diagnosis”
39
Here we must be clear on the sense in which we are using the term “cause.” It is not
uncommon to say that when a particular disease has been identified as the source of a person’s
signs and symptoms, the diagnosis has identified the “cause” of those signs and symptoms.
In an extended sense this is not incorrect, but not in the sense covered by the concept of
etiology, which deals with the question of what causes the disease itself. Malaria provides a
helpful example. For centuries malaria was easily diagnosed in typical cases involving
malarial paroxysm—shaking chills alternating with high fever and sweats over a two- or
three-day cycle. However, the cause, in any useful sense, was unknown (the very name
indicates the cause was assigned to “bad air.”) Identifying the cause of malaria in detail is a
triumph of modern medical research, beginning in 1880 with Laveran’s observation of
parasites in the blood of infected individuals, and continuing in the subsequent decades as the
different species of Plasmodium responsible for the variations of the disease, and the role of
mosquitos in spreading the infection was worked out in detail. See the history section of the
Wikipedia article on malaria, Malaria, WIKIPEDIA (May 5, 2018), https://en.wikipedia.org
/wiki/Malaria. So a physician in 1875 could diagnose the disease, and even treat some cases
fairly well with quinine, but had no well-warranted idea of the cause of the disease itself—its
etiology.
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superficially) is beyond the scope of the practitioner’s training an expertise,
and represents no more than a conjectural hypothesis at best. There is no
training, formal or otherwise, in “differential etiology” in medical school.
Indeed, in civil cases, courts have recognized the important distinction
between differential etiology and differential diagnosis, and that the former
is a much more dubious proposition. As one civil court put it bluntly, “The
differential diagnosis method has an inherent reliability; the differential
etiology method does not.”40 Part of this is because doctors receive training
in diagnosis, but not etiology. But part of it is also because etiological
questions offer no opportunity for learning from experience. As there is no
treatment for shaking (or other abuse), there simply is no mechanism for
learning about or informing a physician about whether a diagnosis” of abuse
was correct or incorrect;41 without such feedback, there is no opportunity to
learn.42
Moreover, as one of us has observed previously:
As problematic as the causation determination can be in tort cases,
that determination, employing a differential etiology
methodology, is even more challenging in SBS/AHT cases. The
reason is simple. In the typical tort case the question posed to the
expert is whether a known historical fact connects causally to a
known injury or outcome. But in SBS/AHT cases, the historical
fact at issue—whether the accused violently shook or shook and
slammed the child—is itself unproven and unknown. In the SBS/
AHT context, the expert is asked not just to relate cause to effect

40

Bowers v. Norfolk S. Corp., 537 F. Supp. 2d 1343, 1361 (M.D. Ga. 2007), aff’d, 300
F. App’x 700 (11th Cir. 2008). See also TUERKHEIMER, supra note 20, at 76; Findley, supra
note 35.
41
One of us has explained this previously in this way: “Experience can be a valuable
part of any expert’s expertise, if it is the sort of experience from which the expert can learn.
The true differential diagnosis—diagnosing a patient’s medical illness or condition for
purposes of prescribing treatment—at least has the potential for enabling the doctor to learn
from experience, and hence for improving reliability. If the doctor misdiagnoses an illness or
condition, the treatment will likely fail, and the doctor will adjust the diagnosis and the
treatment accordingly. But because there is no treatment for abuse, judgments about causation
(etiology) do not offer similar opportunities for feedback and learning, and hence for ensuring
experience-based reliability. Asking doctors to draw legal conclusions, like causation,
imposes demands on science that it is ill-suited to meet.” Findley, supra note 35, at 191–92.
42
See, e.g., Gordon D. Schiff, Minimizing Diagnostic Error: The Importance of Followup and Feedback, 121 AM. J. MED. S38, S38 (2008) (“An open-loop system (also called a
‘nonfeedback controlled’ system) is one that makes decisions based solely on preprogrammed
criteria and the preexisting model of the system. This approach does not use feedback to
calibrate its output or determine if the desired goal is achieved. . . . [Such a system] cannot
engage in learning.”); Eta S. Berner & Mark L. Graber, Overconfidence as a Cause of
Diagnostic Error in Medicine, 121 AM. J. MED. S2, S10 (2008) (discussing the problems with
absent or delayed feedback in medical diagnosis).
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when both the alleged cause and effect have been observed, but to
relate cause to effect when only the effect has been observed; it
asks the expert to divine not only the relationship between the
precipitating event and the outcome, but to divine even the
existence of the alleged precipitating event itself, which has not
been observed or otherwise proven.43
Given all this, it is important to keep in mind that expert testimony in
SBS/AHT cases is not just routine expert evidence. It is often the whole
case, or the primary evidence of guilt. And yet it is highly tenuous. Thus,
we believe shifts in the scientific and medical understandings underlying the
SBS/AHT hypothesis necessarily take on greater significance than Professor
Imwinkelried recognizes.
IV. THE VARIED LEGAL ISSUES THAT CAN ARISE RELATED TO THE
EXPERT TESTIMONY IN SBS AND LIKE CASES
Professor Imwinkelried illustrates his point by referring to the Ninth
Circuit’s decision in Gimenez v. Ochoa,44 and in particular by contrasting it
to the Wisconsin Court of Appeals’ decision in State v. Edmunds.45 Again,
we fear, Professor Imwinkelried’s analysis paints too broadly, and masks
important distinctions between the cases, and the very limited nature of the
holding in Gimenez. Before explaining why, however, it is worth noting that
the shifting science related to SBS/AHT—as with any developing scientific
matter—can pose a variety of legal issues in the post-conviction context,
which require varied analyses. One issue inevitably relates to admissibility
of expert opinions, whether the jurisdiction follows Daubert46 or Frye,47 or
some other admissibility standard. We take it that Professor Imwinkelried’s
analysis in this symposium is not addressed to admissibility of either the
prosecution or defense experts in such cases—a matter that Professor
Imwinkelried has addressed in detail in prior writing.48 Other claims arising
43

Findley, supra note 35, at 192 (footnote omitted).
Gimenez v. Ochoa, 821 F.3d 1136 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 503 (2016).
45
State v. Edmunds, 746 N.W.2d 590 (Wis. Ct. App. 2008).
46
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
47
Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
48
Edward J. Imwinkelried, Shaken Baby Syndrome: A Genuine Battle of the Scientific
(and Non-Scientific) Experts, 46 CRIM. L. BULL. 1, 3 (2010) (arguing that “given the current
state of the empirical data, there is a genuine battle of the experts . . . [and that, therefore,]
both sides should be permitted to present their theories to the trier of fact”). Even on that issue,
however, it is worth noting that, while in global terms, Professor Imwinkelried is correct that
expert testimony on both sides is likely admissible, in particular aspects or applications, some
claims that have been made by experts in the past are clearly now scientifically wrong, and
hence can no longer be admissible. These include claims that physicians at one time regularly
made for example, that nothing can cause the triad of findings except violent shaking; or that
44
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from evolving science relate to the standards for granting a new trial based
on shifted science. But even within that category, the issues can be varied
and nuanced. In some cases, for example, the question might be whether the
science has shifted sufficiently to reveal that the prosecution relied upon
false evidence at trial. In others, it might be whether shifts or emerging
debates are adequate to satisfy a jurisdiction’s standards for granting a new
trial based on newly discovered evidence. In others, the question will be
whether new scientific evidence is sufficient to establish innocence to a
degree sufficient to permit a federal court in habeas review to permit a
procedurally defaulted claim to proceed under Schlup v. Delo,49 or to permit
a federal habeas court consider a successive petition. In still others, the
question will be whether the shifted science is enough to meet whatever
freestanding claim of actual innocence there might be under the Due Process
Clause after Herrera v. Collins.50 It is in this regard that we fear Professor
Imwinkelrieid’s analysis obscures these distinctions, and thus fails to
recognize the many instances in which the kinds of evidence presented in
Gimenez might indeed warrant granting post-conviction relief.
Gimenez addressed just two (or three) of the issues outlined above—
and they were ones under which the petitioner was required to meet the most
onerous of all of the various legal standards that govern these various claims,
made even more onerous because the claim was raised in a federal habeas
challenge to a state court conviction under the very tight restrictions imposed
by Congress in that context. The first claim was that Due Process was
violated because the prosecution’s expert witnesses presented false
testimony at trial.51 It was only in that context that the court ruled that
shifting medical opinions and emerging controversies are not enough,
because disagreements, even profound ones, do not prove prior testimony to
be false. The court explained: “To the extent that this new testimony
contradicts the prosecution’s expert testimony, it’s simply a difference in
opinions—not false testimony.”52
The second, and related, third claim similarly alleged that the trial
testimony was false, but somewhat differently claimed that the new evidence

short falls cannot kill; or that a child cannot suffer a lucid interval after suffering a fatal brain
injury. For a discussion of these limitations, see Findley et al., supra note 10, at 245–51, 302–
06. Further, it is worth noting that, when criminal responsibility is at stake, simply throwing
such disputes to juries to resolve, most likely inconsistently from case to case, is not
necessarily a good practice comporting with substantial justice, but that problem is probably
better handled through principles of sufficiency of evidence rather than by reference to
admissibility.
49
513 U.S. 298 (1995).
50
506 U.S. 390 (1993).
51
Gimenez v. Ochoa, 821 F.3d 1136, 1142 (9th Cir. 2016).
52
Id.
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proved Gimenez’s actual innocence such that he was entitled both to seek
relief in a “successive” habeas petition and substantively entitled to relief.
But again, the standard was too onerous to meet in the face of disagreement
among experts. As the court put it, “Gimenez can’t prove by ‘clear and
convincing evidence’ that ‘no reasonable factfinder’ would have found him
guilty but for the introduction of purportedly flawed SBS testimony.”53
As this brief analysis of the issues demonstrates, Gimenez does not at
all address admissibility of any of the expert evidence, or more importantly,
whether a new trial should be granted based on newly discovered evidence
(based on new SBS/AHT research) or ineffective assistance of counsel
(based on counsel’s failure to present existing research)—these latter claims
being the ones that most frequently arise in post-conviction SBS litigation.
It was precisely such a claim that the Wisconsin court addressed in State v.
Edmunds.54 There, the court concluded that, where the case depended
entirely on expert opinions; and where the jury at trial had been told that
nothing could have caused the triad of findings but shaking or shaking with
impact, that the child could not have experienced a “lucid interval,” and that
the medical science on these points was settled and indisputable; then under
those circumstances the emergence of contrary science after trial was indeed
enough to constitute newly discovered evidence and require a new trial, at
which the jury could consider the competing expert opinions. The Edmunds
Court explained: “[T]here has been a shift in mainstream medical opinion
since the time of Edmunds’s trial as to the cause of the types of injuries
Natalie suffered. . . . However, it is the emergence of a legitimate and
significant dispute within the medical community as to the cause of those
injuries that constitutes newly discovered evidence.”55 Unlike in Gimenez,
the defendant’s burden was not to prove that the testimony from trial was
indisputably false, but rather to show that new science constituted new
evidence that created at least a reasonable probability that a jury would find
reasonable doubt and acquit.56
53

Id. at 1145.
In the interest of full disclosure, we note that one of us, Findley, was counsel for
Audrey Edmunds in that litigation.
55
State v. Edmunds, 746 N.W.2d 590, ¶ 23 (Wis. Ct. App. 2008).
56
This is the substantive standard of harmfulness to be applied to evidence not before
the jury as the result of ineffective assistance of counsel, applicable to all jurisdictions under
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). If the new evidence comes from advances in
science since the trial, however, there is no currently no clear constitutionally necessary
uniformity in the standard to be applied from state to state, since the original trial was free of
constitutional error when it took place. Nevertheless, many states do apply a test analogous
to the Strickland test of harm to determine the propriety of granting a new trial based on newly
discovered evidence. See the cases collected in footnote 57 below. In addition, we believe
that this standard is the morally correct standard for evaluating the propriety of giving a new
trial in all cases of “fresh evidence,” as the British call it, wherever it falls into the artificial
54
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Unfortunately, that is a scenario that Professor Imwinkelried does not
address at all, despite his reference to Edmunds. Yet that is the context in
which courts are now most frequently granting post-conviction relief in
SBS/AHT cases.57 Worse, by juxtaposing Gimenez against Edmunds,
dichotomy between evidence that was not before the jury because of ineffective assistance of
counsel or because it is considered “newly discovered.” Professor Imwinkelried’s “general
standard” asks different questions concerning the evaluation of new science-based
knowledge. In order to obtain relief, he says “(1) the accused presents testimony about a new
analytic technique developed in subsequent scientific research; (2) that technique yields a
different outcome than the expert technique used at the prior trial; and (3) the validation of
the new technique is so extensive that it either discredits the prior expert testimony or
seriously undermines confidence in its correctness.” Imwinkelried, supra note 1, text at 19
n.83. First, on a purely technical level, it should not matter if the “analytic technique”
deployed is new, as long as the results are new and could not have been obtained by a
reasonably diligent defense attorney for trial. The undermining of comparative bullet lead
analysis did not result from new techniques, but from known research techniques newly
deployed. Second, the general standard does not directly ask a question about the probable
effect of the new information on a jury. While Professor Imwinkelried’s general standard
might be interpreted in this way, it might not, and we believe that the effect on a jury of the
new information in the context of the whole case is the pole star for determining the propriety
of a new trial grant in every case.
57
For examples of other cases in which courts have ordered new trials in SBS / AHT
cases based on the shifting science, either because the science is newly discovered, or because
counsel was ineffective for failing to use it at trial, or because the defense was otherwise
denied resources needed to challenge the medical evidence, see People v. Roberts, 892
N.W.2d 353 (Mich. 2017) (ineffective assistance of counsel); Commonwealth v. Millien, 50
N.E.3d 808 (Mass. 2016) (ineffective assistance of counsel); Commonwealth v. Epps, 53
N.E.3d 1247 (Mass. 2016) (ineffective assistance of counsel and newly discovered evidence);
Isham v. State, 161 So.3d 1076 (Miss. 2015) (ineffective assistance of counsel); People v.
Ackley, 870 N.W.2d 858 (Mich. 2015) (ineffective assistance of counsel); Brown v. State,
152 So.3d 1146 (Miss. 2014) (new trial granted because trial court erroneously denied funds
for defense to hire experts to challenge State’s expert medical evidence); People v. Baumer,
781 N.W.2d 309 (Mich. 2010) (ineffective assistance of counsel); State v. Schoonmaker, 176
P.3d 1105 (N.M. 2008) (ineffective assistance of counsel); State v. Hales, 152 P.3d 321 (Utah
2007) (ineffective assistance of counsel); State v. Weaver, 554 N.W.2d 240 (Iowa 1996)
(ineffective assistance of counsel); People v. DiMambro, 897 N.W.2d 233 (Mich. Ct. App.
2016) (ineffective assistance of counsel); In re Pers. Restraint of Fero, 367 P.3d 588 (Wash.
Ct. App. 2016) (newly discovered evidence); Ex Parte Henderson, 384 S.W.3d 833 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2012) (newly discovered evidence); State v. Hansen, 805 N.W.2d 915 (Minn. Ct.
App. 2011) (newly discovered evidence); State v. Ware, 679 S.E.2d 797 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009)
(ineffective assistance of counsel); People v. Bartok, 953 N.E.2d 91 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007); Ex
Parte Briggs, 187 S.W.3d 458 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (ineffective assistance of counsel);
People v. Bailey, 999 N.Y.S.2d 713, 728 (Cty. Ct., Monroe Cty. 2014) (newly discovered
evidence); State v. Hyatt, No. 06M7-0CR00016-02 (Cir. Ct. Shelby Cty., Mo., Nov. 2007)
(newly discovered evidence); Illinois v. Rieken, No. 05C-CFJ75 (Cir. Ct. Iroquois Cty., Ill.,
Mar. 2009) (newly discovered evidence); State v. Witt, No. 2-CA-CR2011-0320, 2012 WL
5991566 (Ariz. Ct. App. Nov. 30, 2012) (newly discovered evidence); Alexandra Gross, John
Peel, NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS (2012), https://www.law.umich.edu/special/e
xoneration/Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=3813 (newly discovered evidence); Maurice
Possley, Joel Lehmer, NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS (July 29, 2012),
https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=3953 (newly
discovered evidence); Joseph Shapiro, Free, But Not Cleared: Ernie Lopez Comes Home,
NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Mar. 5, 2012), https://www.npr.org/2012/03/05/147969316/free-but-not-
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Professor Imwinkelried creates the impression that they two cases reach
contradictory results, and that Gimenez is the more principled. But the reality
is, they are not inconsistent; they just address different legal claims that
require different analyses (and in some cases, different outcomes). Edmunds
and the growing body of like cases are analytically and factually sound,
regardless of the limitations of federal habeas law in addressing narrow
claims like those addressed in Gimenez.
V. THE ULTIMATE SIGNIFICANCE OF NEWLY RECOGNIZED
CONTROVERSIES IN THE MEDICO-LEGAL HYPOTHESES
UNDERLYING EXPERT TESTIMONY IN SUCH CASES
What’s missing from Professor Imwinkelried’s analysis is recognition
that the case he posits—expert trial testimony based on a solid foundation at
trial that is then challenged post-conviction by a single new study that
contradicts the trial experts, raised in a narrow context (like federal habeas)
where the convicted person’s burden is to prove that the trial testimony was
demonstrably false, or the individual is demonstrably innocent—is so narrow
and extreme as to be almost meaningless. In the real-world context of SBS/
AHT litigation, the much more frequent scenario is one in which expert
testimony constituted almost the entirety of the proof at trial, the scientific
foundation for that testimony was never (and still is not) there, the research
undermining the SBS/AHT testimony either did not yet exist or was
erroneously overlooked, and so the jury never had the opportunity to
consider the real legal and scientific issues in the case. In those
circumstances, neither law nor logic requires what Gimenez requires—proof
that the science at trial has been indisputably shown to be false. Rather,
Edmunds and the growing number of like cases that have followed58 strike
that balance, establishing that new challenges to the medical opinions at trial
often are enough to warrant a new trial when the science is this central to the
case, and the challenge is so serious that a jury ought in fairness to hear it
because there is a reasonable probability of an acquittal given the new
evidence.

cleared-ernie-lopez-comes-home (ineffective assistance of counsel); Barry Siegel, Judging
Parents as Murderers on 4 Specks of Blood, L.A. TIMES (July 11, 1999), http://articles.lat
imes.com/1999/jul/11/news/mn-54984 (newly discovered evidence); Kenneth Marsh, CAL.
INNOCENCE PROJECT (2018), https://californiainnocenceproject.org/read-their-stories/kenn
eth-marsh/ (newly discovered evidence); Armando Castillo Vacated After 13 Years, ARIZ.
JUST. PROJECT (May 21, 2015), https://www.azjusticeproject.org/manifest-injusticeprofiles/armando-castillo (ineffective assistance of counsel and newly discovered evidence).
Still other courts have also granted relief under the more difficult standards requiring a
petitioner to establish actual innocence. See, e.g., Del Prete v. Thompson, 10 F. Supp. 3d 907
(N.D. Ill. 2014); Robins v. State, No. 65063, 2016 WL 5801204 (Nev. Sept. 22, 2016).
58
See id.
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And this is no longer just a judicial response to this problem. In
jurisdictions where state law provided no avenue for relief in such cases,
legislatures are beginning to respond by creating statutes designed to permit,
even require, new trials when new evidence emerges to challenge the science
relied upon at trial. Texas was the first of these states,59 followed thereafter
by California.60 In both states, the statutes now provide a remedy when
scientific evidence presented at trial has been undermined by subsequent
research. It is a response that only makes sense. While the tensions between
law and science have been widely recognized in many contexts, it is in cases
like this—where weak science constitutes the entirety of the case—that the
law must most readily accommodate shifts and challenges to that science.

59

Texas State Bill 344 authorizes courts to grant relief in state habeas corpus petitions
where the petitioner shows that relevant scientific evidence that is currently available but was
not available at the time of trial if the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the
person would not have been convicted had the new evidence been presented at trial. See S.B.
344, 85th Leg., (Tex. 2017), https://openstates.org/tx/bills/85/SB344.
60
California Penal Code section 1473, subdivisions (b)(1) and (b)(3), provide a right to
a new trial under either of two circumstances: (1) if the expert repudiates his or her own
opinion given at trial; or (2) if the opinion given at trial is undermined by subsequent
“scientific research or technological advances.” CAL. PENAL CODE §1473(b)(1), (b)(3) (West
2017).

